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INTRODUCTION
A principle tenet of Anglo-American jurisprudence is that every person is entitled to the
“fruit of his labors” unless public policy considerations justify otherwise. 1 As a result, the right
of publicity doctrine has been developed. This doctrine prevents unauthorized commercial gain
resulting from the use of an individual’s name, likeness, or persona.2 The right of publicity gives
the individual the exclusive right to control and profit from the use of their identity for
commercial promotion.3 In order for an individual to bring a claim for damages using the right
of publicity doctrine, the individual must have achieved “publicity values of substantial
pecuniary worth.” 4 Most of the time this is only possible if the individual has put in a great deal
of time, effort, skill, and [usually] even money in order to develop their public image. 5
Previously, the right of publicity has been used to protect humans, but not the likeness of
non-human characters. More recently, however, the right of publicity has expanded to protect
the likeness of sports figures in video games and superheroes in comic books. Furthermore,
current law dictates that only a person whose image is appropriated may bring a claim for
damages under the right of publicity, such as when the appearance resembles a famous human
personality and is used for commercial gain in a virtual environment.
This paper will discuss whether avatars in virtual environments have a right of publicity.
A virtual environment is “an interactive computer simulation which lets its participants see, hear,
use, and even modify the simulated objects in the computer-generated environment.”6 The

1

Melville B. Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS 203 (1954).
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 46 (2008) (“[o]ne who appropriates the commercial value of a
person’s identity by using without consent the person’s name, likeness, or other indicia of identity for purposes of
trade is subject to liability for the relief appropriate under the rules state in §§ 48 and 49”).
3
Woodrow Barfield, Intellectual Property Rights in Virtual Environments: Considering the Rights of Owners,
Programmers and Virtual Avatars, 39 Akron L. Rev. 649, 675 (2005).
4
Nimmer, supra note 1.
5
Id.
6
Barfield, supra note 3, at 649.
2
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specific type of virtual environment that this paper will focus on is one kind of massively multiplayer online role-playing game, (“MMORPG”), called Second Life7. Once a player enters a
MMORPG, they participate in a variety of activities with other players who are accessing the
game the same way from all over the world.8 A participant in a MMORPG is allowed to design
a virtual representation of his/her identity, an avatar, which is displayed in the online virtual
environment. “Virtual avatars may represent the actions of a user, different aspects of a user’s
persona, or the user’s social status in the virtual environment.”9 Furthermore, an avatar can take
on any form, whether a realistic representation of the user who created it, another person’s
identity, an animal, or a mythical creature.10
Part I will discuss the origins of the right of publicity. Part II will define the right of
publicity. Part III will look at the early cases concerning the right of publicity. Part IV will
analyze how courts attempt to balance the rights of publicity versus the right to free speech. Part
V will determine whether the right of publicity doctrine may be further expanded to protect the
likeness of non-human virtual avatars including celebrity “look-alike” avatars and avatars
created based on another avatar. Part V will also discuss the choice of law that would likely be
applied in a right of publicity case brought involving Second Life violations of the right of
publicity.
I.

The Origins of the Right of Publicity
The right of publicity did not come to be recognized overnight. The process took several

decades, with many improvements over the years.11 The first step taken towards the recognition
7

Second Life, available at http://secondlife.com/?v=1.1 (last visited on February 11, 2010) (Second Life is a free 3D
virtual world where users can socialize, connect and create using free voice and text chat).
8
Barfield, supra note 3, at 650.
9
Id. at 651.
10
Id.
11
J. Thomas McCarthy, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLICITY & PRIVACY, § 1:4 (explains the historical landmarks which led to
the legal recognition of publicity and privacy rights in a person's identity).
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of the right of publicity was an article written by Louis Brandeis and Samuel Warren titled “The
Right to Privacy” which discussed the creation of the theory of a broad “right of privacy”
focusing upon the “affront to human dignity caused by public disclosure of embarrassing private
facts.”12 Brandeis and Warren were concerned with preserving privacy against a press who
overstepped the bounds of “propriety and decency” by broadcasting details of sexual relations in
daily newspapers. The next step was the rejection of common law privacy rights in New York in
1902 in the Roberson case.13 In Roberson, the New York Court of Appeals held that a woman
had no right to stop the unauthorized use of her portrait captioned by “Flour of the Family,” to
advertise flour.14 As a result of public outcry stemming from the disapproval of this decision,
New York enacted its first right of privacy law in 1903.15 Two years later, in 1905, Georgia16
and then 14 other states began to recognize a common law right of privacy. 17

These

developments were the first steps taken to extend the “right of privacy” to the legal recognition
of the “unpermitted advertising or other commercial use of a person’s identity.”18 The next
developments included (1) the creation of a “right of publicity,”19 in the 1953 Haelan case and

12

Id.; see Louis Brandeis & Samuel Warren, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 196 (1890).
Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538 (1902) (a picture of Abby Roberson was plastered over
town on a flier advertising a baking flour company, which used the picture without permission or compensation. The
family claimed that the unwanted attention caused the girl severe embarrassment and humiliation. The N.Y. Court of
Appeals said there was no law against it).
14
Anthony L. Pessino, Mistaken Identity: A Call to Strengthen Publicity Rights for Digital Personas, 4 VA. SPORTS
& ENT. L.J. 86, 98 (2005).
15
Id.
16
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190 (1904) (the state high court determined that a man had a valid
invasion of privacy claim against an insurance company for the unauthorized commercial use of his name and
picture. This was the first state case to recognize such a right).
17
Alabama, Arizona, California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Missouri, Montana, North
Carolina, Oregon, and Pennsylvania.
18
McCarthy, supra note 11.
19
Haelan Labs v. Topps Chewing Gum, 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953) (a bubble gum manufacturer who had obtained
contracts with big-league baseball players for the exclusive right to use their names and likenesses in connection
with the sale of gum or candy sought to enjoin defendant who used these advertising devices in the promotion of his
candy. Defendant had argued that the ball players possessed no legal interest in their photographs other than the
right of privacy, which could not be assigned to plaintiff. The court stated that, in addition to his privacy right, a
man has a “right in the publicity of his photograph, i.e., the right to grant the exclusive privilege of publishing his
picture”).
13
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(2) the 1954 article by Professor Nimmer which built a legal framework for the “right of
publicity.”20 The Haelan right of publicity gave a person more than the right to assign an interest
in his name or photograph.21 By allowing a person to make a grant of the publicity value of his
name or photograph, the Haelan case gave protection to a person’s commercial interest in his/her
personality independent of his/her privacy interest.22 This implied that such commercial interest
might justify legal protection of an individual against unauthorized use of his name or picture
aside from any privacy interest.23 The court reasoned that although a famous person may
generally invoke the right of privacy against an advertiser who appropriates his name or picture
without permission, this right may not always afford adequate protection to his commercial
interest in his personality.24 The reason is because celebrities complaining of the unauthorized
use of their name or likeness have sometimes been held to have waived their right of privacy
because of their publicity.25 Professor Nimmer’s article identified two policy considerations that
he believed provide compelling support for the right of publicity: “first, the economic reality of
pecuniary values inherent in publicity and, second, the inadequacy of traditional legal theories in
protecting such publicity values”.26
In 1960 Professor Prosser wrote a law review article in which he broke down all privacy
rights into four distinct and different torts: (1) intrusion; (2) disclosure; (3) false light; and (4)
appropriation.27

His theory was extremely influential and is not only embodied in the

Restatement of Torts but has also been uniformly accepted by the courts.28 Lastly in the 1970s,

20

Nimmer, supra note 1.
Haelan Labs, 202 F.2d 866.
22
Id.
23
Joseph R. Grodin, The Right of Publicity: A Doctrinal Innovation, 62 Yale L.J. 1123 (1953).
24
Id. (citing Haelan Labs, 202 F.2d 866).
25
Id.
26
Nimmer, supra note 1.
27
William Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960).
28
McCarthy, supra note 11.
21
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Congress, in response to various social concerns coined as invasions of “privacy” passed laws
aimed at problems such as electronic eavesdropping, government computerized record keeping,
confidentiality of credit and educational records, and intrusive acts by bill collectors. 29 “These
statutes illustrate that ‘privacy’ is no longer a single, unified body of law, but rather, it has been
subdivided into a series of discrete parts, each addressing a specific social concern.”30
The latest major development in the establishment of the right of publicity doctrine was
the 1977 case Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.31 In Zacchini, the Supreme Court
provided important recognition that publicity rights are a legitimate economic interest which can
be recognized by states.32 The state’s interest in recognizing a right of publicity is in “protecting
the proprietary interest of the individual in his act in part to encourage such entertainment.”33
The Zacchini decision established that state publicity rights were not automatically preempted by
the First Amendment.34
II.

The Right of Publicity Defined
In the United States, (“U.S.”), the right of publicity exists in twenty-eight states and is

largely protected by state common, statutory law, or both.35 Some states consider the right to be
a property type right while other states consider it a tort type right stemming from the right to
privacy.36 New York, for example, recognizes it as part of the right of privacy within its civil
rights law and not a standalone right.37 Eighteen states have enacted statutory protections for the
29

Id.
Id.
31
Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
32
Jon M. Garon, Publicity Rights in Bytes: Contemporary Issues in Entertainment and Sports Law, 11 Chap. L. Rev.
465, 484 (2008) (citing Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 572).
33
Grodin, supra note 23.
34
Id.
35
Barfield, supra note 3 (internal citation omitted).
36
Joel Anderson, What’s Wrong With this Picture? Dead or Alive: Protecting Actors in the Age of Virtual
Reanimation, 25 LOY. L.A. ENT. L. REV. 155, 161 (2005).
37
Barfield, supra note 3.
30

5

right of publicity but these differ on points such as the extent of protection, its application to noncelebrities, and the available remedies for violations.38 The California right of publicity statute,
Cal. Civ. Code § 3344, has been the most tested right of publicity statute. The statute states,
(a) Any person who knowingly uses another's name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness, in any manner, on or in products, merchandise, or goods,
or for purposes of advertising or selling, or soliciting purchases of, products,
merchandise, goods or services, without such person's prior consent, . . . shall be
liable for any damages sustained by the person or persons injured as a result
thereof.
(d) For purposes of this section, a use of a name, voice, signature, photograph, or
likeness in connection with any news, public affairs, or sports broadcast or
account, or any political campaign, shall not constitute a use for which consent is
required under subdivision (a).
To establish a common law prima facie case for the violation of the right of publicity, the
plaintiff must prove the following elements: (1) that he is the owner of the recognizable identity
or a licensee; (2) that the defendant commercially used the identity; (3) that plaintiff did not
authorize such use; and (4) that such appropriation resulted in economic harm to the plaintiff.39
Early right of publicity cases only recognized a right of publicity of individual celebrities
because celebrities are more widely known and therefore have more identifiable indicia of
identity.40 Now, the prevailing view is that the right of publicity also extends to non-celebrities
so long as they can prove a recognizable identity.41 Courts, however, are still reluctant to extend

38

Anderson, supra note 36 (“Indiana offers the broadest right of publicity protection; its statute protects a
personality’s economic interest in his name, voice, signature, photograph, image, likeness, distinctive appearance,
gestures, or mannerisms. California limits its protection to unauthorized usage of name, voice, signature,
photograph, or likeness. Kentucky limits its right of publicity protection to unauthorized appropriations of name and
likeness, while New York protects against the unauthorized use of name, portrait, picture, or voice”) (internal
citations omitted).
39
See, e.g., Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831, 835 (6th Cir. 1983) (plaintiff must
establish the defendant commercially exploited the plaintiff’s identity without consent to obtain a commercial
advantage).
40
See, e.g., Haelan Labs., 202 F.2d at 868 (professional baseball players had a commercial, proprietary interest in
their names and likenesses; Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620, 622 (N.Y. App. Div. 1977)
(“there is no question but that a celebrity has a legitimate proprietary interest in his public personality”).
41
Stacy Allen et al., Non-Human Persons and the Right of Publicity,
http://images.jw.com/com/publications/1185.pdf (internal citations omitted).
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the right of publicity beyond individual persons.42 They have uniformly denied attempts by nonhuman “persons,” such as corporations or institutions, to claim a right of publicity. 43

Such

entities must rely on trademark, trade name, and trade dress law for protection.44
A. Defining Persona
Numerous cases have expanded what constitutes a persona protectable by a right of
publicity. The most prominent cases are Pesina v. Midway Manufacturing Co.,45 Newcombe v.
Adolf Coors Co.,46 and Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp.47

In Pesina v. Midway

Manufacturing Co., plaintiff Pesina, a martial artist, was hired to model for characters of a coin
operated video game for the video game manufacturer.48 The martial artist’s movements were
videotaped by a computer and extensively edited.49 The arcade game was then licensed to the
home video market and a home version was created by reformatting the software.50 Pesina
brought an action in Illinois against various game manufacturers for infringement of the common
law right of publicity based on the unauthorized use of his persona, name, and likeness in the
home version of Mortal Kombat, Mortal Kombat II, and the related products.51 The court stated
that “[a] plaintiff claiming the infringement of this right must show that, prior to the defendant’s
use, the plaintiff’s name, likeness, or persona had commercial value.”52 The court granted
defendants’ motion for summary judgment because Pesina’s name, likeness, or persona lacked

42

Id.
McCarthy, supra note 11 at §3:74 (citing University of Notre Dame Du Lac v. Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp.,
15 N.Y.2d 940 (1965) (education institution not a “living person” under the New York statute); Shubert v. Columbia
Pictures Corp., 189 Misc. 734 (Sup 1947) (corporation not a “living person” protected by New York publicity law)).
44
Id.
45
948 F. Supp. 40 (N.D. Ill. 1996).
46
157 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 1998).
47
85 F.3d 407 (9th Cir. 1996).
48
Pesina, 948 F. Supp. at 42.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id.
52
Id. (internal citation omitted).
43
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value prior to the plaintiff’s association with Mortal Kombat and Mortal Kombat II. 53 The court
continued to say, “[a] plaintiff alleging unauthorized use of his likeness must show that the
likeness was recognizable.”54 The district court found that Pesina offered no evidence to support
the assertion that his likeness the recognizable while the defendants presented convincing
evidence that the public did not recognize Pesina in the home version of Mortal Kombat, Mortal
Kombat II, and the related products.55 The defendants showed that after a comparison of Pesina
and the game character, Johnny Cage, who allegedly resembled the plaintiff, only 6% of 306
Mortal Kombat users identified Pesina as the model.56 As to the defendants’ use of Pesina’s
name, it appeared only in Mortal Kombat, only for eight seconds, and only when a player won
the game.57 Pesina could have argued that he became so associated with Johnny Cage that the
character invoked Pesina’s identity, but to prevail on this theory, Pesina would have to show that
his identity became “inextricably intertwined” in the public mind with Johnny Cage. 58 Providing
such evidence would prove that his right to publicity was invaded by the defendants’ use of
Johnny Cage.59 Pesina could not prove this since the evidence showed that Pesina was neither a
widely known martial artist nor that the public recognized him as a model for Johnny Cage. 60
In Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., Killian’s Irish Red Beer, owned by Coors Brewing Co.,
published an advertisement in a Sports Illustrated “swimsuit edition” that featured a drawing of
an old-time baseball game.61 The baseball scene focused on a pitcher in the windup position and

53

Id.
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
Id.
58
Id.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 42-43.
61
Newcombe, 157 F.3d at 689.
54
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the background included a single infielder and an old-fashioned outfield fence.62 The players’
uniforms did not depict an actual team, and the background did not depict an actual stadium.63
Newcombe, a former major league baseball all-star, recognized the pitcher in the ad as himself in
his earlier days and filed suit.64 Among other claims, Newcombe alleged that his identity had
been misappropriated in violation of California statutory and common law.65 Comparing the
advertisement’s drawing to an old newspaper photograph of Newcombe, the court noted that
they were “virtually identical, as though the black and white photo had been traced and colored
in.”66 The minor differences were that the pitcher’s number had been changed from “36” to
“39,” and the color of the bill of his hat had been changed. 67 In finding a genuine issue of fact in
dispute, the court denied summary judgment for the defendant, and held that the Newcombe was
identifiable as the pitcher in the advertisement.68 The court noted that the drawing in the
advertisement and the newspaper photograph of Newcombe upon which the drawing was based
were virtually identical.69 The pitcher’s stance, proportions and shape were identical to the
newspaper photograph of Newcombe; even the styling of the uniform was identical, such as the
wrinkles in the pants.70 The court found that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to
whether Newcombe’s identity was used in the advertisement and reversed the district court’s
grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant.71
In Abdul-Jabbar v. General Motors Corp., the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
addressed the issue of whether a person has a right of publicity in their former name. The case
62

Id.
Id.
64
Id.
65
Id.
66
Id. at 690.
67
Id. at 693.
68
Id.
69
Id.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 696.
63
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involved a television advertisement General Motors ran during the 1993 NCAA men’s basketball
tournament which used Abdul Jabbar’s former name without his consent.72 Abdul Jabbar
contended that this improper use of his likeness violated California’s statutory and common law
right of publicity in addition to his federal and state trademark rights under Lanham Act, 15
U.S.C.S. § 1125(a).73
The district court had ruled against Abdul-Jabbar finding that he had abandoned his use
of the name and therefore General Motors’ use of it could not be construed as an endorsement.74
The Court of Appeals reversed and remanded stating that the “right of publicity protects
celebrities from appropriations of their identity not strictly definable as ‘name or picture.’”75 The
Court of Appeals determined that a person retained an interest in their name and that its use in
advertising still required consent.76
The general rule is that appropriation that does not involve a person’s identity usually
does not violate publicity rights.77 The most common appropriation of identity includes the
commercial exploitation of a person’s name, voice, likeness, photograph, or signature. 78 The use
of a person’s name nevertheless may not violate that statute if it does not constitute the taking of
“identity,” but merely uses the name to identify another individual or character in a fictional
work.79 On the other hand, one may violate a person’s common law right of publicity by using
much more indirect indicia of identity than name, voice, likeness, or signature where the
appropriation is such that the public is nevertheless able to identify the person whose publicity

72

Abdul-Jabbar, 85 F.3d at 409.
Id. at 410.
74
Id. at 409.
75
Id. at 415.
76
Id. at 409.
77
Nimmer, supra note 1.
78
CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 3344, 3344.1 & App. B-1 (West 2009).
79
Newton v. Thomason, 22 F.3d 1455 (9th Cir. 1994).
73
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rights are infringed.80 For example, using a name with other words that evoke the celebrity, such
as “Here’s Johnny,” or “Velvet Elvis,” can be actionable.81 Also using an individual’s nickname,
pen name, or stage name can violate the right of publicity. 82 Furthermore, the use of a celebrity
look alike in advertising may violate the right of publicity if the use is intended to evoke the
celebrity’s identity for commercial purposes.83 Use of a “sound alike” singer can also violate the
original musician’s right of publicity.84 Additionally, use of a unique pose can violate the
common law right of publicity, even if the individual’s likeness is not used, if the individual is
readily identifiable by that pose.85 Occasionally an actor’s identity will be intertwined with a
fictional character the actor portrays in the mind of the public. 86 The characters themselves are
often independently protected by copyright, and are owned by someone other than the actor
portraying them.87 Commercial exploitation of the character may nevertheless violate the right
of publicity of the individual portraying the character, even if permission was obtained from the
copyright owner, if the exploitation elicits the identity of the actor to the public.88 However, the

80

Mark S. Lee, ENTERTAINMENT AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW, §3:56 (2009).
Id. at §3:57 (citing Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc., 698 F.2d 831 (6th Cir. 1983) (use of phrase
“Here’s Johnny” in connection with a portable toilet violated Johnny Carson's right of publicity); Elvis Presley
Enterprises, Inc. v. Capece, 141 F.3d 188 (5th Cir. 1998) (use of “velvet Elvis” to identify a bar and an advertising
violated rights of Elvis Presley)).
82
Mark S. Lee, supra note 80, at §3:57; (citing Ali v. Playgirl, Inc., 447 F. Supp. 723, (S.D. N.Y. 1978) (use of
nickname “the greatest” to identify Muhammad Ali together with a silhouetted image, violated his right of
publicity); Hirsch v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 90 Wis. 2d 379 (1979) (use of “crazy legs” to identify a shaving gel
violated plaintiff’s publicity rights, because he was well known as “crazy legs” based on his football exploits)).
83
Mark S. Lee, supra note 80, at §3:58; (citing Allen v. Men’s World Outlet, Inc., 679 F. Supp. 360 (S.D. N.Y.
1988) (use of Woody Allen look alike in magazine advertisement for clothing store enjoined); Presley’s Estate v.
Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339 (D.N.J. 1981) (Elvis impersonator violated right of publicity).
84
Mark S. Lee, supra note 80 at §3:59; (citing Midler v. Ford Motor Co., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988) (use of
“sound alike” singer in advertising violated Bette Midler’s common law rights of publicity).
85
Mark S. Lee, supra note 80, at §3:60; (citing Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 1998)
(drawing of pitcher in pose identical to that of Don Newcombe violated right of privacy even though face not
visible)).
86
Mark S. Lee, supra note 80, at §3:65.
87
Id.
88
Id. (citing Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 845 (S.D. N.Y. 1975) (recognizing rights of
publicity of Laurel & Hardy against use of characters authorized by copyright owner); Chaplin v. Amador, 93 Cal.
App. 358 (1st Dist. 1928) (actor and movie studio enjoined from imitating the appearance and mannerisms of
Charles Chaplin's “Little Tramp”).
81
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individual has the burden of proving that the public identifies him or her when they see the
character rather than simply the character itself, or there is no right of publicity violation.89
B. What Is “Commercial Use?”
Not all uses of a person’s identity violate the right of publicity. Only those uses which
qualify as unauthorized commercial use are disallowed. Generally, advertising, merchandising,
and exploitative media uses constitute commercial use.90 Using an individual’s identity in
advertising usually violates publicity rights as this is at the core of the right of publicity
protection.91 The most common violation of the publicity right often involves use of some aspect
of an individual’s identity to advertise a product without the individual’s permission.92 The
bottom line is that advertising is anything which seeks to sell a product or service. 93 It can,
however, be difficult to determine whether a particular use is an advertising use, a media use, or
both.94
Furthermore, merchandising uses such as the use of a celebrity’s name or likeness on
merchandise or memorabilia including but not limited to t-shirts, bumper stickers, coffee mugs,
computer mouse pads, posters, are generally thought to violate the right of publicity.95
89

Mark S. Lee, supra note 80, at §3:65 (citing Landham v. Lewis Galoob Toys, Inc., 227 F.3d 619 (6th Cir. 2000)
(actor’s right of publicity was not violated when character he played in motion picture was reproduced in an “action
figure,” since the physical image was not the same and the public did not identify him from that role); Nurmi v.
Peterson, 10 U.S.P.Q.2d 1775 (C.D. Cal. 1989) (court dismissed the right of publicity claim on the ground her
previous portrayals of a character called “Vampyra” were not evoked by Defendant's portrayal of the character
“Elvira”).
90
Mark S. Lee, supra note 80, at §3:69-3:71.
91
Id. at §3:69.
92
Id. (citing Newcombe v. Adolf Coors Co., 157 F.3d 686 (9th Cir. 1998) (polls in advertising); Onassis v. Christian
Dior-New York, Inc., 472 N.Y.S.2d 254 (Sup 1984) (look alike in advertising); Waits v. Frito-Lay, Inc., 978 F.2d
1093 (9th Cir. 1992) (sound alike in advertising); Motschenbacher v. R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 498 F.2d 821 (9th
Cir. 1974) (identifiable object in advertising); White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir.
1992) (evocative setting in advertisement); Lombardo v. Doyle, Dane & Bernbach, Inc., 58 A.D.2d 620 (2d Dep’t
1977) (use of “signature sound” in advertising).
93
Mark S. Lee, supra note 80, at §3:69
94
Id.
95
Id. at §3:70 (citing Guglielmi v. Spelling-Goldberg Productions, 25 Cal. 3d 860, (1979) (characterizing use of a
celebrity’s likeness in “the sale of such commercial products as plastic toy pencil sharpeners, soap products, target
games, candy dispensers, and beverage stirring rods” as within the traditional purview of the right of publicity);
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Additionally, uses of an individual’s image in news media may violate the right of publicity if
such use is aimed at exploiting the individual.96 Such uses, however, raise First Amendment
issues97 which will be discussed later in this paper.
III.

Recent Cases Concerning the Right of Publicity
In Carson v. Here’s Johnny Portable Toilets, Inc.,98 Johnny Carson sued the maker and

marketer of portable toilets dubbed “Here’s Johnny: The World’s Foremost Commodian,” under
the common law right of publicity claiming that the usage appropriated his signature Tonight
Show greeting without his permission.99 The district court dismissed Carson’s right of publicity
claim because the maker of the toilets did not use Carson’s name or likeness. 100 The Court of
Appeals felt that the district court’s approach was too narrow.101 The court stated that when the
celebrity’s identity is commercially exploited, there has been an invasion of his right whether or
not his “name or likeness” is used.102 Moreover, Carson’s identity may be exploited even if his
name, John W. Carson, or his picture is not used.103 The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
therefore held that the use of the phrase “Here’s Johnny: The World’s Foremost Commodian,”
was a violation of Mr. Carson’s common law right of publicity.104
In 1985 in Midler v. Ford Motor Co.,105 Ford Motor Company and its advertising agency,
Young & Rubicam, Inc., advertised the Ford Lincoln Mercury with a series of nineteen 30 or 60

Brockum Co., a Div. of Krimson Corp. v. Blaylock, 729 F. Supp. 438, 446 (E.D. Pa. 1990) (“event” T-shirts violated
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second television commercials in what the agency called “The Yuppie Campaign.”106 The aim
was to make an emotional connection with Yuppies, bringing back memories of when they were
in college.107 Different popular songs of the seventies were sung on each commercial. 108 The
agency tried to get “the original people,” that is, the singers who had popularized the songs, to
sing them.109 Where the agency failed, the agency had the songs sung by “sound alikes.” Bette
Midler, the plaintiff was done by a sound alike.110 The “sound alike” imitated plaintiff to the
best of her ability.111 After the commercial was aired, plaintiff and the “sound alike” were told
by a number of people that it sounded exactly like plaintiff.112 Neither plaintiff’s name nor her
picture was used in the commercial, and the agency had a license from the copyright holder to
use the song.113 Plaintiff sued for the unauthorized use of her voice under the California Civil
Code § 3344 and the California common law right of publicity. 114 The district court believed
there was no legal principle preventing imitation of plaintiff’s voice and granted summary
judgment in favor of defendants.115 On appeal, the court reversed.116 The Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit held that “when a distinctive voice of a professional singer is widely known
and is deliberately imitated in order to sell a product, the sellers have appropriated what is not
theirs and have committed a tort in California.”117 The court reasoned that plaintiff made a
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showing, sufficient to defeat summary judgment and that the defendants for their own profit in
selling their product did appropriate part of her identity.118
In White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc.,119 Vanna White sued Samsung under the
California Civil Code § 3344 and the California common law right of publicity for creating an ad
that included a robot in a blond wig and fancy dress standing on a game show set similar to the
set used on the television show “Wheel of Fortune.”120 The district court in White relied on the
Eastwood v. Superior Court to establish the pleading requirements for the common law right of
publicity cause of action. Eastwood held that the right of publicity “may be pleaded by alleging
(1) the defendant’s use of the plaintiff’s identity; (2) the appropriation of plaintiff's name or
likeness to defendant’s advantage, commercially or otherwise; (3) lack of consent; and (4)
resulting injury.”121 The district court dismissed White’s claim for failure to satisfy Eastwood's
second prong, reasoning that defendants had not appropriated White’s “name or likeness” with
their robot ad.122 The court of Appeals in White agreed with the lower court’s dismissal of the
statutory right of publicity claim because the robot ad did not make use of White’s name or
likeness, however, they felt that the common law right of publicity was not so confined. 123 The
court of Appeals held that the robot was a sufficient likeness to Vanna White to support a
common law right of publicity claim,124 saying “it is not important how the defendant
appropriated the plaintiff’s identity, but whether the defendant has done so.”125
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In 1997, following in the footsteps of the White decision, the Court of Appeals for the
Ninth Circuit heard a case similar to White. In Wendt v. Host Int’l, Inc.,126 Host International
created robotic figures resembling George Wendt’s and John Ratzenberger’s figures and placed
them in airport bars without their permission. Wendt and Ratzenberger brought a common law
right of publicity claim, a statutory right of publicity claim under Cal. Civ. Code § 3344, and a
trademark infringement action under 15 U.S.C.S. § 1125(a) of the Lanham Act.127 The appellate
court reversed the district court’s ruling which granted summary judgment in favor of Host
International and remanded.128 The appellate court reasoned that summary judgment was not
appropriate because the degree to which these robots resemble, caricature, or bear an
impressionistic resemblance to Wendt and Ratzenberger was clearly material to a claim of
violation of Cal. Civ. Code § 3344.129
IV.

The Right of Publicity vs. The First Amendment
The right of publicity implicates speech because it involves the monitoring of an

individual’s image, name, or information that appears in the media.130

Therefore, the

individual’s exercise of the right of publicity may hinder society’s First Amendment right to this
information.131

The key is to balance a person’s right of publicity against society’s First

Amendment right which entails determining where the boundaries between the right of publicity
and the First Amendment lie.132
As discussed, the right of publicity is an intellectual property right where a defendant
may not take, without permission, a plaintiff’s image for commercial use to support the
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defendant’s message.133 On the other hand, “courts protect the constitutional right to free
dissemination of ideas.”134 The Restatement of Unfair Competition restricts the right of publicity
from, “the use of a person’s identity in news reporting, commentary, entertainment, in works of
fiction or in advertising that is incidental to such uses.”135 It has therefore been necessary for
courts to balance the right of publicity and speech to make sure that neither a person’s right of
publicity nor society’s First Amendment right is curtailed.
In Zacchini, the only right of publicity Supreme Court case, the Court considered whether
a media company should be allowed to air an entire circus act on an evening newscast, despite
the objection of the circus performer.136 The Court held that although public figures are entitled
to less First Amendment protection, the First Amendment does not protect the media where it
attempts to broadcast a performer’s entire performance without his consent.137

The Court

rationalized that “a performance is the product of petitioner’s own talents and energy, the end
result of much time, effort, and expense...”138 Thus, the Court held it was necessary to allow
Zacchini to have control over his own image, even though it meant preventing a television
newscast broadcast.139
In Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc.,140 Comedy III brought an action
against an artist, Saderup, seeking damages and injunctive relief for infringement of the right of
publicity under former Cal. Civ. Code §§ 990 (now Cal. Civ. Code §§ 3344.1141).142 Comedy III

133

Id. at 324.
Id.
135
Id. (quoting supra note 2, at § 47).
136
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 563.
137
Gil Peles, The Right of Publicity Gone Wild, 11 UCLA Ent. L. Rev. 301, 307 (2004) (citing Zacchini, 433 U.S. at
575).
138
Zacchini, 433 U.S. at 575.
139
Peles, supra note 60.
140
Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 21 P.3d 797 (Cal. 2001).
141
Cal. Civ. Code § 3344.1  Same as Cal. Civ. Code § 3344, but applies to a “deceased personality.”
134

17

was the registered owner of all rights to the former comedy act known as the Three Stooges,
which are now deceased personalities.143

Saderup had many years experience in making

charcoal drawings of celebrities which are used to create lithographic and silkscreen masters,
which are then used to produce lithographic prints and silkscreened images on T-shirts.144
Saderup created the original drawings and was actively involved in the ensuing lithographic and
silkscreening processes.145 Without securing Comedy III’s consent, Saderup sold lithographs
and T-shirts bearing a likeness of The Three Stooges reproduced from a charcoal drawing he had
made.146 The California Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the Court of Appeals. 147 The
Court agreed that by producing and selling these T-shirt products, defendants used the likeness
of personalities on products, merchandise, or goods within the meaning of the statute.148
The California Supreme Court held that there was no significant transformative or
creative contribution in defendants’ work.149 It used the concept of transformative fair use from
copyright law as the foundation for balancing the rights of publicity and speech. 150 As it
explained, “both the First Amendment and copyright law have a common goal of encouragement
of free expression and creativity...”151

Having identified fair use as the framework, the

California court created a rule for analyzing right of publicity cases:
when artistic expression takes the form of a literal depiction or imitation of a
celebrity for commercial gain, directly trespassing on the right of publicity
without adding significant expression beyond that trespass, the state law interest
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in protecting the fruits of artistic labor outweighs the expressive interests of the
imitative artist. On the other hand, when a work contains significant
transformative elements, it is not only especially worthy of First Amendment
protection, but it is also less likely to interfere with the economic interest
protected by the right of publicity. As has been observed, works of parody or
other distortions of the celebrity figure are not, from the celebrity fan’s viewpoint,
good substitutes for conventional depictions of the celebrity and therefore do not
generally threaten markets for celebrity memorabilia that the right of publicity is
designed to protect.152
The court in Comedy III continued to say that “[a]nother way of stating the inquiry is whether the
celebrity likeness is one of the ‘raw materials’ from which an original work is synthesized, or
whether the depiction or imitation of the celebrity is the very sum and substance of the work in
question.”153
The California Supreme Court reaffirmed its approach in Winter v. DC Comics154 in
which the work in question was a comic book. In the comic book, Texas recording artists,
Johnny and Edgar Winter alleged that the comics falsely portrayed them as “vile, depraved,
stupid, cowardly, subhuman individuals who engage in wanton acts of violence, murder and
bestiality for pleasure and who should be killed.”155 By determining that the use of the redrawn
figures could be used for the comic books, the California court made clear that most insertions of
caricatures of celebrities in other literary works would be considered a transformative use
protected by the First Amendment.156

Furthermore, the court added that when the artistic

expression takes the form of a literal depiction or imitation of a celebrity for commercial gain, it
is a direct violation of the right of publicity absent any expressive elements beyond the
appropriation.157
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In contrast to the transformative, fair use analysis adopted by California, an Oklahoma
court did not incorporate the fair use doctrine when analyzing publicity rights. 158 Instead, in
Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass’n,159 the court directly balanced the
interest of the First Amendment rights against the benefits of protecting publicity rights160 by
looking to the “social purpose” of the use.161

The court held that works parodying and

caricaturing celebrities are protected by the First Amendment.162 In Cardtoons, a baseball card
company produced comic-book style artwork of baseball players. The court reasoned that the
defendant, by poking fun at baseball players, provided, “an important form of entertainment and
social commentary.”163 To arrive at its holding, the court balanced the “underprotection” and
“overprotection” of the right of publicity in question.164 According to the court, “underprotection
of intellectual property reduces the incentive to create; overprotection creates a monopoly over
the raw material of creative expression.”165
In C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, Inc. v. Major League Baseball Advanced Media,
L.P., et al.,166 the court decided whether fantasy sports operators can use professional athletes’
names and historical statistics without a license from the players, the players association and/or
the relevant league.167 C.B.C. Distribution and Marketing, Inc., (hereinafter, “CBC”) brought
this action for a declaratory judgment against Major League Baseball Advanced Media, L.P.,
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(hereinafter, “MLB”) to establish its right to use, without license, the names of and information
about major league baseball players in connection with its fantasy baseball products. 168 MLB
counter-claimed, maintaining that CBC’s fantasy baseball products violated rights of publicity
belonging to major league baseball players and that the players, through their association, had
licensed those rights to Advanced Media, the interactive media and Internet company of major
league baseball.169

At the trial court level, MLB argued that CBC was violating the baseball

players’ individual rights of publicity, which are protected under Missouri state law. Although
the trial court held that MLB failed to establish these state-law rights, the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit reversed this determination and found that state-law rights of publicity were
implicated. It further held, however, that First Amendment considerations trumped these statelaw rights since the baseball players’ names and their corresponding statistics used in CBC's
fantasy baseball games were all readily available in the public domain and therefore should be
usable by anyone.170 Because no one can exercise exclusive control over information in the
public domain, the Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s judgment in favor of CBC, thus
allowing CBC to continue using MLB players’ names and statistics without a license.171
The CBC court used Zacchini to justify employing a balancing test weighing First
Amendment free speech concerns against any potential claim Advanced Media may have to right
of publicity protection.172 The CBC court also looked at CBC’s basis for using the identities of
Major League Baseball players, whether it was for commercial value or for some other
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expressive purpose.173 The court argued the use of the players’ names was merely for the purpose
of identifying the statistics necessary for the functioning of the game.174
V.

Do Avatars Have a Right of Publicity?
A “virtual avatar” (hereinafter, “avatar”) is often used to describe “the simulation of a

graphical form representing a particular person in a virtual environment.”175 An avatar is created
using software and algorithms.176 A recent development in avatars is that they are getting more
intelligent.177 Avatars are capable of performing many tasks such as writing poetry, playing
chess, composing music, and exemplifying a range of emotions and facial expressions.178
There are a couple of applications of the right of publicity in the context of avatars. The
most common application is the creation of an avatar based on a real celebrity. This application
is the easiest for recognition of a right of publicity claim. Another application is the creation of
an avatar based on another avatar. The analysis for the latter application is trickier as will be
discussed below. Common to both applications, however, is the question of whether the avatar
needs to show financial game from its publicity in order to have a valid right of publicity claim.
Another important consideration when considering a right of publicity claim based on
Second Life is the choice of law that will apply. Will Second Life’s Terms of Service govern,
meaning that California’s right of publicity law will control, or will it be based on where the
players reside? Additionally, what if a celebrity wants to bring a right of publicity action
because an avatar is misappropriating his/her likeness, will Second Life’s choice of law clause
govern or can the celebrity bring a claim in the state he/she resides?
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A. Celebrity “Look-Alike” Avatars
A celebrity has a right to prevent people from using his or her image by bringing a right
of publicity claim. Therefore, if an avatar was created which resembled the image of the
celebrity, it would probably be treading on the celebrity’s rights. In the event of a suit, the
avatar’s owner would have a possible defense. The owner could claim that the images are
sufficiently artistic and interpretative to give them First Amendment protection as artistic works.
Although the First Amendment does provide some protection, commercial speech is entitled to
less protection than other kinds of speech and therefore the burden would be on the owner to
prove that the use was not for a commercial purpose.
B. Creation of an Avatar Based on Another Avatar
If the copied avatar is famous because it was created by a famous person then only the
famous person will be able to bring a right of publicity claim. However, if the copied avatar is
itself a celebrity and the creator of the avatar has no celebrity of his own apart from that of the
avatar then the analysis is more complicated. Imagine the avatar has become so famous that
people in both Second Life and the real world recognize its identity or indicia of identity such as
name, voice, likeness, or signature. Will the avatar be able to stop the unauthorized commercial
use of his identity or indicia of identity? What if a voice sound-alike or look-alike of the avatar
was used? Will the avatar be able to bring a right of publicity claim in a real-world court or in
Second Life? If we were discussing an individual, the individual would be allowed to bring a
claim in a real-world court. The issue, however, is that an avatar is not an individual.179
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Since the right of publicity is largely protected by state common, statutory law, or both,
the avatar would not be able to rely on any one body of law.180 Furthermore, since most state
statutes currently only recognize a right of publicity for individuals, unless the statute
specifically excluded an avatar, we would have to determine whether an avatar could be
classified as an individual. The logical analysis may be that since an avatar does not look like a
living person and is not a living person it should not be characterized as an individual and should
therefore not have a right of publicity.
Some courts, however, have ruled that likeness is not a requirement which may leave
open the possibility that an avatar may one day have a right of publicity. The key case here is
Motschenbacher v. Reynolds,181 which examined whether under California state law the use of a
distinctively marked car in a commercial infringed a driver’s right of publicity. 182 Plaintiff
Motschenbacher was an internationally known professional driver of racing cars who was
recognized in racing circles and by racing fans.183

He derived part of his income from

manufacturers of commercial products who paid him for endorsing their products.184 Plaintiff
consistently “individualized” his cars to set them apart from those of other drivers.185 In 1970,
defendants, R. J. Reynolds Tobacco Company and William Esty Company, produced a
commercial which utilized a “stock” color photograph depicting several racing cars on a
racetrack.186 Plaintiff’s car appeared in the foreground, and although plaintiff was the driver his
facial features were not visible.187 Plaintiff Motschenbacher appealed from the district court’s
order granting summary judgment in favor of defendants in his suit seeking injunctive relief and
180
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damages for the alleged misappropriation of his name, likeness, personality, and endorsement in
nationally televised advertising for Winston cigarettes.
The Court of Appeals agreed with the district court in that the plaintiff’s “likeness” was
itself unrecognizable; however, it felt that the court’s further conclusion of law that the driver
was not identifiable as the plaintiff was erroneous in that it failed to attribute proper significance
to the distinctive decorations appearing on the car.188 The markings were not only peculiar to the
plaintiff’s car but they made some persons think the car in question was the plaintiff’s and to
infer that the person driving the car was the plaintiff.189 The holding of this case may suggest
that an individual would have a right of publicity if the avatar is identifiable as the individual.
Whether an avatar that is identifiable with another avatar has a right of publicity is a question
that has yet to be answered.
Although current case law does not extend to non-human personas, there have been a
number of cases which have left open the possibility that avatars may one day have a right of
publicity. For example, the White decision involved the use of a robot in a blonde wig and fancy
dress standing on a game show set similar to the “Wheel of Fortune.”190 The court rejected
Samsung’s parody defense because the ad’s spoof of Vanna White was not its primary purpose;
the main purpose was to sell Samsung VCR’s.191

This case leaves open the possibility that if

avatars were to receive legal rights, the use of an avatar which exactly resembles another avatar,
even if part of its purpose is for parody, could be actionable if the other elements of the right of
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publicity are met.192 Moreover, the White case implies that a virtual avatar could be found to
have violated the right of publicity of a human.193
Another case that may be important for virtual avatars involved a sound-alike of the
actress and singer Bette Midler in Midler v. Ford Motor Co.194 The Ninth Circuit found that use
of the sound-alike in a commercial was a violation of Midler’s right of publicity.

195

According

to this case, a virtual avatar should not copy the voice of a famous person because this would
probably be a violation of the person’s right of publicity.196 Furthermore, if an avatar has legal
rights, a court can find a right of publicity violation if an avatar’s voice was copied assuming that
the avatar’s voice was used for commercial gain and so long as the voice had prior commercial
value and was recognizable.
An important case for virtual avatars is Eros v. John Doe since it was the first case were a
player claimed copyright and trademark infringement by another player, of a product which was
created in Second Life specifically for use in Second Life.197 Although this case did not deal
with the right of publicity issue, it did acknowledge that avatars may have rights and may bring
claims in a real-world court for violations that occur within Second Life. The parties, however,
settled the case before the courts were given the opportunity to decide the legal issues, such as
whether virtual goods used wholly within a virtual world are indeed goods as legally defined,
and therefore have the rights that are attached to goods.198 In an amended complaint, Eros
claimed John Doe had been making and selling illegal copies of the adult-themed virtual objects
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(SexGen Platinum Base Unit v4.01 and the SexGen Platinum+Diamond Base v5.01) to other
Second Life residents in violation of Eros’ exclusive copyrights.199
If Second Life had virtual laws and courts then an avatar would be able to bring his/her
right of publicity claim within Second Life200 The issue, here, however, is that the avatar would
have a potential remedy within Second Life but not in the real-world, so if the avatar’s likeness
was commercially used by someone in the real-world the avatar would have no recourse against
the infringer since most states currently do not allow a non-individual to bring a claim for right
of publicity.
The difficulty in assigning rights to avatars is that an avatar is nothing more than code.
The avatar does what the person at the computer commands him/her to do. The avatar is not
capable of acting on its own and therefore should not be recognized as a person and afforded the
rights of a person. Unless an avatar becomes intelligent enough where it can act on its own,
states will not recognize avatars as deserving of the right of publicity. Additionally, as virtual
avatars gain intelligence and create works independently of the user controlling them, significant
legal and policy issues will arise.201 Courts will need to decide what legal rights should be
afforded to avatars and how far these rights should extend.
Even if an avatar could bring a right of publicity claim, the avatar would first need to
show that the infringer gained financially from its publicity. This factor, however, depends on
the statutory law defining the right of publicity. As an example, California’s right of publicity
statute states that a violation of the right of publicity includes “the commercial exploitation of a
person’s name, voice, likeness, photograph, or signature.”202
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C. Choice of Law
Before entering Second Life a user must agree to a set of terms called the “Terms of
Service” (“ToS”).203 A key provision in the ToS is the “Governing Law” clause which tells the
users which state’s or country’s law will be applied if there is a dispute about the contract.
According to Second Life’s “Governing Law” clause, the choice of law will be California law.204
Another important clause is the Choice of Forum clause which refers to the geographic region
where the complaint must be filed, and where the arbitration or trial will be held to decide any
dispute. Second Life’s Choice of Forum clause, called “Forum for Disputes” states that the
venue shall be the City and County of San Francisco, California except as provided in the
optional arbitration section which is for all matters under $10,000.205 This means that for all
matters over $10,000 the venue shall be the City and County of San Francisco, California.206
Several scenarios concerning Second Life’s choice of law should be examined: (1) a real
life celebrity sues a Second Life user who has given his/her avatar an appearance, voice, etc. that
resembles the celebrity and which is being used for commercial gain; (2) where one user has an
avatar who has become a celebrity in Second Life and another user whose avatar infringes on
that celebrity; and (3) a celebrity avatar and a real world Infringer.
Online worlds are generally hosted at a central location and serve a widespread user
base.207 Although no case has tested a Choice of Law provision of a virtual world or game yet,
courts have generally upheld provisions where similarly positioned companies (AOL, Dell,
203
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Gateway, etc.) imposed Choice of Law provisions choosing the law of their state of
incorporation or headquarters.208 Since Second Life’s Governing Law provision provides that
California shall be the choice of law, any dispute between a user and Second Life will likely be
governed by that provision and so California law will apply regardless of where the user resides.
Although the user may argue that this provision is unreasonable this argument will probably not
prevail.
If, however, a non-party decides to sue a user for violation of the right of publicity or a
celebrity avatar sues an infringer, the analysis becomes more difficult because SecondLife’s ToS
will not apply. In these instances, right of publicity claims will be governed by the substantive
law of the plaintiff’s domicile because rights of publicity constitute personalty. 209 Furthermore,
if the state whose law must be applied has not yet determined the scope of the common law right
of publicity in that state, then the court must predict what the courts in that state would rule as to
the contours of a right of publicity.210 An example of how the domicile principle has played out
in a right of publicity action is the case Shaw Family Archives Ltd v. CMG Worldwide211. In
Shaw Family, plaintiffs sought a judgment declaring that Marilyn Monroe was domiciled in New
York, not California, at the time of her death.212 If she was, defendants would “hold no right to
publicity in Ms. Monroe’s image, because New York did not at the time of Monroe’s death, and
does not today, recognize a posthumous right to publicity.”213 The court held that defendants
were judicially estopped from asserting that Monroe was anything other than a New York
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domiciliary at the time of her death and that plaintiffs were thus entitled to summary judgment
on their claims relating to the photographs.214
What happens if the person who wants to bring the right of publicity claim resides
overseas? Does this person have any right of publicity rights in the U.S? It would seem that a
non-U.S. resident should have no protected right of publicity in the U.S. Courts have found that
for a foreign plaintiff it will be important to consider where the plaintiff has developed and
exploited his right of publicity through licensing agreements, assignments or merchandising
schemes.215 Therefore, even if the plaintiff resides abroad, as long as he/she has exploited
his/her rights in the U.S., the state in which this exploitation occurred will be the state whose
right of publicity law is applied.216 For example, in Bi-Rite Enterprises, Inc. v. Bruce Miner Co.,
the plaintiff members of the groups resided both in the U.S. and abroad but they all exploited
their rights in the U.S. through licensing agreements with Artemis, Inc. and Bi-Rite.217
Therefore, the court concluded although all of the members lived in Great Britain, the law of
Georgia governed the rights of Judas Priest, Iron Maiden, and Duran Duran since their
merchandising representative was located in Macon, Georgia and was responsible for policing
and protecting the use of the groups’ names, logos, and likenesses.218
As for Choice of Forum clauses, many people have challenged these clauses, and the
results vary.219 Some courts have allowed companies with central distribution of products to a
world-wide consumer base to require lawsuits to be filed near their home bases, but some cases
have also gone the other way.220 At the very least, if a user attempts to bring a claim outside the
214
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specified choice of forum as provided by the ToS, Second Life will likely move to dismiss the
case since it was filed in another jurisdiction.221
CONCLUSION
Currently, the right of publicity protects famous individuals from having their identity
appropriated by both real-world and virtual world designers. In the future, it may be possible for
an avatar to bring a right of publicity claim if the avatar’s visual appearance or voice is copied,
assuming the avatar has gained celebrity status, and the copied avatar is used for commercial
gain.
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